Drug Offences and the Death Penalty in Malaysia: Fair Trial Rights and Ramifications

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with the support of Harm Reduction International
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Any errors are the authors’ own.

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Introduction

The May 2018 election of the Pakatan Harapan Government marked a significant turning point in Malaysian politics; it was the first time that the Barisan Nasional party had lost power since Malaysia established its independence in 1957. Having successfully campaigned on a platform promising to revoke the ‘mandatory death by hanging in all Acts’,¹ the newly elected Government was quick to impose a full moratorium on executions in July 2018.² On 10 October 2018, World Day Against the Death Penalty, the hon. Liew Vui Keong, Minister of Law in the Prime Minister’s Department announced that the Government would go further than its campaign commitment, stating that ‘[a]ll death penalty will be abolished … full stop’.³ This position was confirmed on the world stage on 13 November 2018, when Malaysia was one of the 123 United Nations (‘UN’) Member States that voted in support of a universal moratorium for the death penalty at the Third UN Commission; a notable occasion as it was the first time the Malaysia had voted in favour of this resolution.⁴

By 13 March 2019, there was a clear shift in the Government’s position. In response to vehement public opinion opposing the proposed death penalty reforms, the Government announced that it would now only be enacting amendments to repeal the mandatory death penalty for 11 specific offences found in the Penal Code 1999 (‘Penal Code’) and the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (‘Penal Code’).⁵ These offences included murder, terrorism related offences and treason. Notably, drug trafficking offences remained subject to mandatory sentencing except in very limited circumstances.⁶ In August 2019, the Minister announced the formation of a Special Committee to Review Alternative Sentences to the Mandatory Death Penalty led by the former Chief Justice Tan Sri Richard Malanjum.⁷ The Special Committee was due to report in December 2019 with a view to tabling the Bill, repealing mandatory sentencing for those 11 specific offences (as identified above) by March 2020.⁸ The Special Committee submitted its 128-page Report on 11 February 2020, however as of 28 May 2020, it has not been released.⁹

On 24 February 2020, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad announced his resignation due to the collapse of his coalition of support.¹⁰ At the time of writing, the new Government’s position in relation to supporting the draft Bill is unknown.

Current Composition of Death Row in Malaysia

Under domestic law, ‘[w]hen any person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged till he is dead.’¹¹ The sentence is carried out by a warrant issued by the sentencing court, directed to the prison where the execution is to take place.¹² The Medical Officer of that prison and at least two prison officials must attend.¹³ Other persons who may attend the execution include any Minister of Religion and such relatives of the prisoner or other person as admitted by the prison.¹⁴ A Magistrate must report the death of the inmate within 24 hours.¹⁵

As at December 2019, 1,280 people were on death row in Malaysia.¹⁶ Eighty-nine per cent of these people are male, and more than two-thirds of all persons on death row have been convicted of drug trafficking offences, according to figures by Amnesty International.¹⁷ Forty-three percent of all sentenced to the death penalty are foreign nationals.¹⁸ According to Amnesty International it appears that the most represented foreign national group was Nigeria (21%) followed by Indonesia (16%) and Iran (15%).¹⁹ Amnesty International also revealed that although only 11% of inmates on death row are women, 86% of these are foreign nationals.²⁰ Ninety-five percent of all women on death row were convicted for drug trafficking offences.²¹ Of the 1,280 people on death row, 453 have an appeal pending to either the Court of Appeal or to the Federal Court. The remaining 827 people appear to have Pardon Board applications pending, and execution warrants had not been received as at December 2019.²²

¹². Criminal Procedure Code 1955 (Malaysia) s 277 (‘CPC’).
¹³. CPC s 281(d).
¹⁴. Ibid.
¹⁵. CPC s 281(iii).
¹⁶. CPC s 281(ii).
¹⁹. Question and Answer, 2 December 2019 English Translator (document on file with authors).
²¹. Ibid.
²². Question and Answer, 2 December 2019 (English Translator) (document on file with authors).
From the limited data available on the death penalty in Malaysia we know that ‘a large proportion of those on death row have less advantaged socio-economic backgrounds, which becomes particularly relevant in a criminal justice system where safeguards in death penalty cases are especially lacking, both in law and in practice, for foreign nationals and people convicted under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952’.23

**Drug Offending and the Death Penalty**

Government sources have reported that since the Independence of Malaysia in 1957, half of the 469 executions that have taken place were in relation to drug trafficking.24

In 2018, Amnesty International reported that of 136 of the 195 death penalty sentences imposed, related to offending under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA’).25 This is of particular concern considering that the offence of drug trafficking is not considered to be in the category of a ‘most serious offence’ for which the death penalty may be imposed under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), the cornerstone international treaty addressing the death penalty, albeit Malaysia has not ratified this.26 In this context, it should be noted that Malaysia is one of 35 countries in the world that imposes the death penalty for drug offences and in 2019, was one of 13 countries to actually sentence accused to death for drug trafficking.27

As Malaysia’s most extreme punitive response to its so called ‘war on drugs’, the imposition of the death penalty is the most acute form of human rights violations associated with drug suppression.28

This report considers whether Malaysian death penalty trials for drug-related offences comply with fair trial guarantees, and whether accused persons are provided with the high level of procedural fairness and access to justice required. Part 1 of this report sets out the legal framework and standards which apply in capital cases involving drug charges under both international law and Malaysian law. In Part 2, we examine whether Malaysia’s domestic legislation adheres to fair trial benchmarks in cognate common law countries and international human rights standards. Part 3 builds upon this analysis with a discussion of relevant decisions and interviews with Malaysian lawyers who have experience in criminal law, and specifically death penalty cases. A comprehensive methodology is attached in Appendix 1. Part 4 of this report provides an analysis of how the peculiarities of Malaysia’s DDA undermine the fair trial rights of accused persons charged with drug offences. Finally, Part 5 of this report makes key recommendations. Crucially, our research finds that death penalty sentences for drug related offences in Malaysia have been imposed following proceedings that do not meet either the international fair trial standards or similar benchmarks found in the common law.

The purpose of this report is to:

- inform policy debate in Malaysia, and regionally, in relation to the abolition of the death penalty, with a particular emphasis on the death penalty for drug offences;
- help ensure that the trial and sentencing process comply with national and international standards of human rights and due process protections;
- inform discussions about potential reforms of death penalty legislation and judicial discretion; and
- inform discussions about strengthening fair trial guarantees through the introduction of, for example, additional legislative protective measures.

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23. Ibid.
26. See Table 2 below at page 12.
1.1 Malaysian Criminal Justice System

The death penalty has been an integral part of the Malaysian legal system, long before the country obtained independence. At the time of writing, the death penalty is retained for 33 offences covered in eight pieces of legislation, including 12 offences which attract a mandatory death penalty sentence. Most commonly, the death penalty is imposed in cases of drug trafficking or murder. This is reflected in Table 1: Domestic Legislation Retaining the Death Penalty.

Table 1. Domestic Legislation Retaining the Death Penalty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>Mandatory or Discretionary?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>ss 302, 309A-B</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>s 194</td>
<td>Bearing false witness resulting in an innocent victim’s conviction and execution</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>s 305</td>
<td>Assisted Suicide of child or insane person</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>s 2</td>
<td>Rape or attempted rape resulting in death</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>s 396</td>
<td>Gang robbery involving at least five offenders where one participant commits murder during the robbery</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Security Act 1960 (Malaysia), revised 1972</td>
<td>ss 57(1), 59(1)-(2)</td>
<td>Terrorism-related offences not resulting in death</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>s 3A</td>
<td>Robbery not resulting in death</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>s 3A</td>
<td>Kidnapping not resulting in death</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>s 3A</td>
<td>Burglary not resulting in death</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>s 39B</td>
<td>Trafficking in dangerous drugs</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>s 39B(2A)</td>
<td>Trafficking in dangerous drugs where prosecutorial assistance is provided</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>s 121</td>
<td>Treason</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>s 132</td>
<td>Military offense of abetting mutiny that is carried out</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>s 7</td>
<td>Weapons trafficking</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>s 307(2)</td>
<td>Repeat offender (attempted murder where harm actually results and offender was serving sentence of 20 years or more)</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>s 3A</td>
<td>Discharging firearm to murder or cause harm while resisting arrest or escaping lawful custody</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Statute

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>Mandatory or Discretionary?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>s 3A</td>
<td>Being a participant or accomplice in the discharge of a firearm who cannot prove they took all reasonable measures to prevent the discharge of a firearm in an attempt to murder or cause harm while resisting arrest or escaping lawful custody</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>s 121A</td>
<td>Offences against the person of the Rule of the State</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>s 130C</td>
<td>Committing terrorist act</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code</td>
<td>s 374A</td>
<td>Hostage-taking resulting in death</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>s 3</td>
<td>Discharging a firearm in the commission of a scheduled offence</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping Act 1961 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>s 3(1)</td>
<td>Abduction, wrongful restraint or wrongful confinement for ransom</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security Act 1960 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>s 58(1)</td>
<td>Consort with a person carrying or having possession of arms or explosives in security areas</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security Act 1960 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>s 58(1)</td>
<td>Offences in security areas for possession of firearm, ammunition and explosives</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.2 International Death Penalty Frameworks

International bodies, such as the UN, have established significant safeguards and restrictions on the use of the death penalty with the objective of worldwide abolition. Whilst Malaysia is not a signatory to the key treaties limiting the practice of the death penalty (see Table 2 on page 12), international jurisprudence contextualises how drug related offending is considered to be outside the realm of ‘most serious offending’.

In 1966, the right to life was enshrined in Article 6 of the **ICCPR**, which restricted the imposition of the death penalty to only the ‘most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime’. The phrase ‘most serious crimes’ has been interpreted by the UN Human Rights Committee to mean ‘that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional measure’ and that ‘crimes not result directly and intentionally in death …such as drug…offences, although serious in nature, can never serve as the basis, within the framework of Article 6, for the imposition of the death penalty’.

In 1989, the Second Optional Protocol to the **ICCPR** was drafted, committing its members to take ‘all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction’. In 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions compiled a list of crimes which should be excluded from the definition of ‘most serious crimes’, notably including drug-related offences.

Both the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (‘the UNODC’) and the International Narcotics Control Board (‘the INCB’) have criticised the use of death penalty for drug-related offences, stating that the ‘use of the death penalty cannot provide durable solutions or protect people’. Further, in March 2019, the UN Chief Executive Board for Coordination – the main body for supporting the UN intergovernmental bodies on social, economic and related
matters – emphasised that the imposition of the death penalty in drug related offences is not justified in any of the international drug-control conventions, and can undermine potential effective cross-border and international cooperation against drug trafficking.37

1.3 Exclusions in the Application of the Death Penalty

Pursuant to international law and standards, there are four categories of persons who may not be sentenced to death or executed:

- First, children under the age of 18.38 This is included under Malaysian law provided the accused was below the age of 18 at the time of the offence, in accordance with Malaysia’s obligation as a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.39

- Second, people with mental or intellectual disabilities or disorders (including people who have developed disorders after being sentenced to death).40 While Malaysian law prohibits the prosecution of those who offended whilst mentally incapacitated,41 it does not prohibit the imposition or execution of the death sentence for people suffering from general mental health issues.

- Third, pregnant women,42 and mothers of young children (generally up to two years old).43 This is reflected by s 282 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1999 (Malaysia) (‘CPC’).

- Fourth, elderly persons.44 This is because the right to life for the elderly is considered to be ‘particularly vulnerable’, as their ‘old age makes them more susceptible to … cruel or inhuman treatment’.45 For example, the American Convention on Human Rights prohibits the execution of people over the age of 70.46 Increased protections for the elderly exist in a number of other jurisdictions including Vietnam, Indonesia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Sudan, Guatemala, Qatar and Zimbabwe.47 The UN Economic and Social Council has also recommended that States should establish ‘a maximum age beyond which a person may not be sentenced to death or executed’,48 which should be influential upon Malaysia’s implementation of the death penalty. It should be noted, however, that Malaysian law does not prohibit the imposition nor the execution of the death sentence for elderly persons.
2.1 Malaysian Legal Framework

Malaysia’s domestic legal framework contains principles governing fair trials. These principles are embodied either within legislative instruments or the common law (see Table 3: Fair Trial Rights Overview below at page 14). As Malaysia’s legal system developed from common law traditions jurisprudence from other common law countries can form part of the domestic law.49

The Malaysian criminal justice system is adversarial in nature. In broad terms, the criminal process comprises of the following six procedures:

(a) Arrest

- Arrests can be performed by police officers, private persons, Magistrates and a Justice of Peace in compliance with s 15 of the CPC.

(b) Trial

- Malaysia’s adversarial system means that accused persons standing trial are presumed innocent until proven guilty and the prosecution must prove the charge against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.50
- The court hierarchy begins with the Subordinate Courts (comprising the Session Court and Magistrate Court) followed by the Superior Courts, comprising the High Court, Court of Appeal and the Federal Court as invested with increasing judicial power.
- Offences punishable by death (as detailed in Table 1: Domestic Legislation Retaining the Death Penalty, above at page 7) proceed first before the High Court, as it has unlimited jurisdiction (save for matters governed by Islamic family law).

(c) Sentencing & Mitigating Factors

- Once an accused is found guilty, or pleads guilty, they must be sentenced per s 173(m)(ii) of the CPC, in accordance with sentencing principles such as deterrence, rehabilitation, prevention and retribution.51
- Prior to sentencing, courts will consider ‘mitigating’ factors including: age, past criminal record, conditions surrounding the prisoner’s guilty plea, circumstances prior to the commission of the offence, the effects of the conviction on the prisoner’s family, employment, conduct of the prisoner, his or her health, and/or prior offences.52 For mandatory death penalty matters, this stage in the sentencing process is irrelevant as the discretion is removed.

(d) Imprisonment

- Where the accused is sentenced to life imprisonment, the term is effectively for 30 years with remission of one third for good behaviour.53
- Where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment for a fixed period, the sentence begins from the date that the sentence was passed, unless ordered otherwise by the courts.54
(e) Appeals in Court of Appeal

- Appeals are commonly heard before the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court.
- The Court of Appeal can hear appeals from the High Court. These appeals can only be made on questions of law or fact, or mixed law or fact for cases that are first tried in the High Court or the Sessions Court. For cases first tried in the Magistrates Court, appeals shall only be confined to questions of law.
- The Federal Court can hear and decide on appeals from the Court of Appeal. For capital drug offences, trials are typically held before the High Court but this is followed by a two-stage appeal process. First, an appeal is heard before the Court of Appeal. Second, if the convicted prisoner is dissatisfied with that outcome, an appeal may be made to the Federal Court. Both questions of fact and of law can be considered by the Federal Court.

(f) Clemency

- For Malaysia, clemency is granted by the Head of State, on the advice of the Pardons Board.

2.2 International Legal Framework

Notions of ‘judicial fairness’ have been built into the public consciousness for centuries, evidenced, for example, by the 1791 amendments to the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, where the right to remain silent and the right to due process of law prior to sentencing was clearly articulated. A tribunal at the post-Second World War Nuremberg Trials upheld the ‘right to fair trial’ in international criminal law, finding that ‘prosecutors and judges involved in a trial lacking the fundamental guarantees of fairness could be held responsible for crimes against humanity.’ Today, the right to a fair trial is one of the most universally applicable guarantees, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’), and constitutes an important feature of international human rights.

Since the enactment of the UDHR in 1948, the right to a fair trial has been upheld in a number of other documents including legally binding treaties such as the ICCPR, in regional treaties such as the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (‘ADHR’), domestic legislation and common law.

At its most basic, the right to a fair trial is the right to a public hearing, within a reasonable time, by an independent and impartial court. It should be recognised that this right is supported by a number of other rights. Article 14 of the ICCPR for example sets out a detailed list of ancillary rights under the broad ‘right to a fair trial’ headings (see Table 3: Fair Trial Rights Overview below).

According to the UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 6(16), a violation of Article 14 fair trial procedures in a capital trial amounts to a breach of the right to life set out in Article 6; ‘the procedural guarantees therein prescribed must be observed, including the right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the defence, and the right to review by a higher tribunal’.
Historically, initial concern regarding the legitimacy of the death penalty was inherently linked to capital cases involving a denial of due process. Because of the irreversible nature of the death penalty, death penalty proceedings require strict observance of fair trial rights, and the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights Facing the Death Penalty (‘Death Penalty Safeguards’). Further, capital offence trials must be heard by ‘a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’

The abolition of the death penalty is generally considered to be an important element in democratic development. Although Malaysia has not historically supported the abolition of the death penalty, it has become party to at least five of the ‘core human rights’ treaties protecting fair trial rights, as detailed in Table 2: Ratification Status of International Instruments for Malaysia Pertaining to the Death Penalty, below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Date of Accession</th>
<th>Date of Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Covenant on Civil &amp; Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Optional Protocol to ICCPR</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention Against Torture &amp; Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional Protocol of the CAT</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
<td>5 July 1995</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’)</td>
<td>17 February 1995</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional Protocol on the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict</td>
<td>12 April 2012</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 reflects Malaysia’s commitment to observing international legal norms, which has led to a marked increase in Malaysia’s adherence to the rule of law. It is worth noting here that although Malaysia has not signed the UDHR, the Office of the Attorney-General of Malaysia maintains that Malaysia ‘has subscribed to the philosophy, concepts and norms provided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which sets out the minimum and common standard of human rights for all peoples and all nations’, by virtue of its membership to the UN.

### 2.3 Mandatory Death Penalty

In 2004, the Special Rapporteur to the UN reported that mandatory death sentences should be prohibited, as they prevent courts from considering mitigating factors in sentencing. International tribunals have condemned the use of the mandatory death penalty for its failure to consider the ‘particular circumstances of the crime’ and any relevant mitigating factors. Further, the UN Secretary-General has noted that mandatory sentencing makes it ‘difficult if not impossible’ for courts to evaluate individual circumstances that may otherwise remove the offending conduct from being considered as ‘the most serious crime’.
Yet beyond these few examples, international standards do not outline broad sentencing guidelines or mitigating factors to which States must adhere when implementing death sentences (i.e. carrying out executions).

Separate sentencing hearings are not required under Malaysian law and the CPC stipulates that a court must only pass sentences ‘according to law’.

The retention of the mandatory death penalty removes the ability of Malaysian courts to consider individual circumstances and mitigating factors when sentencing people who have been found guilty of capital crimes. However, the Court of Appeal has upheld the constitutional validity of the mandatory death sentence in the DDA in Christin Nirmal v Public Prosecutor. The constitutionality of the sentence was challenged on numerous grounds, including that it fails to permit consideration of mitigating factors. Ultimately, it was held that it is the role of the legislature to amend the DDA if it seeks to allow courts to consider mitigating factors.
Our research shows that the death penalty in Malaysia has been imposed following proceedings that did not meet fair trial standards either in accordance with international, domestic or cognate common law standards. This section considers specific fair trial guarantees or safeguards by first briefly outlining the relevant benchmark before turning to an analysis of the Malaysian experience. Here in particular, interview quotes and case studies are utilised to provide context for the analysis.

Table 3: Fair Trial Rights Overview provides a fair trial rights overview with each fair trial right traced to the relevant Malaysian domestic authority:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right/Guarantee</th>
<th>International Human Rights Frameworks</th>
<th>Domestic Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty</td>
<td>ICCPR Art. 14(2)</td>
<td>Federal Constitution Art. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADHR Art. 20(1)</td>
<td>Islamic Criminal Law: Quran al-Isra’: 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRC Art. 40(2)(i)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to be informed promptly and in detail, in a language which the accused understands, of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her</td>
<td>ICCPR Art. 14(3)(a)</td>
<td>CPC’s 51A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRC Art. 40(2)(ii)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to have adequate time and facility to prepare a defence and communicate with counsel of the accused’s own choosing</td>
<td>ICCPR Art. 14(3)(b)</td>
<td>CPC’s 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADHR Art. 20(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to choose legal assistance, and if unable to select legal assistance, the right to State-provided legal assistance</td>
<td>ICCPR Art. 14(3)(d)</td>
<td>Federal Constitution Art. 5(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRC Art. 40(2)(ii)</td>
<td>CPC’s 28A</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Aid Act 1971 [Malaysia] s 29, Sch. 2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Aid (Amendment) Act 2017 [Malaysia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to be tried without undue delay</td>
<td>ICCPR Art. 14(3)(c)</td>
<td>Federal Constitution Art. 5(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDHR Art. 9</td>
<td>CPC ss 42, 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRC Art. 40(2)(iii)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to Examine and cross-examine witnesses</td>
<td>ICCPR Art. 14(3)(e)</td>
<td>Federal Constitution Art. 5(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to have an interpreter and translation</td>
<td>ICCPR Art. 14(3)(f)</td>
<td>CPC ss 256(8), 265A, 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRC Art. 4(2)(vi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privilege against self-incrimination</td>
<td>ICCPR Art. 14(3)(g)</td>
<td>CPC ss 112(2)-(3), 173(ka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDA s 37A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to appeal conviction and sentence</td>
<td>ICCPR Art. 14(5)</td>
<td>CPC’s 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDHR Art. 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.1 Right to be Presumed Innocent Until Proven Guilty

The presumption of innocence is central to fair trial rights and allows the defence to put the prosecution to proof. This means that it is not for the defendant to prove their innocence, but rather, it is for the prosecution to establish their case beyond reasonable doubt. This is reflected by Art. 14(2) of the ICCPR, which provides that ‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law’, as echoed by the UDHR.77

The presumption of innocence also exists at the domestic level in Malaysia and is implied into Art. 5(1) of the Federal Constitution, though not expressly incorporated.78 However, in practice, Malaysia deviates from the international standards by shifting the evidential burden from the prosecution to the defendant in two significant ways.

First, the prosecution in Malaysia need only establish its case on a prima facie basis. The onus is on the prosecution to prove elements of an offence beyond reasonable doubt,79 which is the same as under English common law.80 It follows that in order to be acquitted an accused only needs to raise a doubt as to the existence of a fact on which the prosecution is relying on, or simply that contrary facts exist.81 Failure to do so however, has been found by the Malaysian judiciary to mean that the prosecution had established its case on a prima facie basis.82 Our research indicates that it is rare that a court will be persuaded that such a doubt exists.

Second, the prosecution can rely on multiple presumptions under Malaysian statute to effectively reverse the burden of proof in criminal proceedings. This is particularly pronounced in death penalty cases involving drug trafficking charges because s 37 of the DDA – discussed in detail below in Part 3 – sets up a series of ‘deeming’ presumptions which allow the prosecution to automatically establish knowledge of the nature of the drug and knowledge of possession of the drug. These are in practice difficult or impossible to rebut, as detailed below in Part 3.

3.2 Right to be Informed Promptly and in Detail, in a Language which the Accused Understands, of the Nature and Cause of the Charge Against Him or Her

(a) Transparency

A central requirement imposed on retentionist States is that their governments make available information on the imposition and use of the death penalty.83 This is because a lack of transparency makes it difficult to monitor execution rates and more broadly, to understand the effect of the death penalty on prisoners over time. Further, the availability and provision of this information enables accurate consideration of key fair trial issues. It also informs dialogue regarding the reform of death penalty practices.

The Malaysian Government has increased efforts to make relevant information publicly available. For example, Question and Answer sessions in Parliament indicate that there are 1,280 people convicted to death by the High Court as at 2 December 2019. Previous Question and Answer sessions stated that between the years of 1970 and 1996, 349 people were executed,84 and that between the years of 1998 and 2015, 33 people were executed.85 Figures released by the Government in March and May 2016 indicated that 12 people were executed and 829 persons were sentenced to death since 2010.86
However, this information is inconsistent and limited. Comprehensive figures on death penalty are not provided and there are no internal systematic monitoring and reporting mechanisms in place, unlike in other countries.

In order to satisfy the duty to be transparent, the Malaysian Government would need to reveal accurate and up to date information on the use of the death penalty. For example, the UN Human Rights Council suggested in 2015 that states ‘make available relevant information disaggregated by sex, age and other applicable criteria, with regard to their use of the death penalty, inter alia, the number of persons sentenced to death, the number of persons on death row, the number of executions carried out and the number of death sentences reversed, commuted on appeal or in which amnesty or pardon has been granted, which can contribute to possible informed and transparent national and international debates, including on the obligations of States with regard to the use of the death penalty’. Transparency is also an issue in the context of judgments; any judgment made in a death penalty case ought to be made public. A lack of transparency may also undermine the right to a fair and public trial, as well as the right to appeal and the ability to submit applications for pardon or commutation. Further, public judgments are necessary to ensure that trials are fair and consistent with past precedent. This is particularly concerning in Malaysian death penalty cases given that there is an inconsistency not only in the available law reports, but also in the provision of written judgments; an issue relevant not only to the High Court but also the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court.

Lawyer Interviewee 1 stated in an interview for this report, that an accused typically knows the reasoning of the court’s decision because the court will:

read it out, and that’s it. Sometimes they do the reporting then you have the reports online, on the journals. But if you decide to appeal then you need the ground. And for review cases, they won’t give them. It’s unfair right? In public interest especially for death row inmates, this is very important. How do we know what’s the basis of the decision? The public and the lawyers are in the dark, but for public it’s even more so.

There are currently no procedural requirements in place within the Malaysian legal framework that facilitate transparency. Malaysian law does not, for example, expressly require courts to produce reasons for their dissenting decisions, or to write a formal dissenting judgment, where such judgments exist. For this reason, there is ‘a dearth of dissenting decisions’ according to Fahri Azzat, a lawyer with 20 years’ experience in death penalty cases.

Another lawyer interviewed for the purpose of this report, Datuk Baljit Singh echoes these sentiments, ‘it’s all always unanimous’.

It should be noted that the perception that there is a lack of dissenting judgments is not a view shared by all lawyers. For example, according to lawyer Mohd Haijan Omar, judges are encouraged to dissent and to ensure that their judgments are in written form:

If the judge doesn’t agree with the majority they can write judgement. That’s how the dynamism of law, that’s how they develop the law you see? And we have had a situation where one of the court appointed judge …writes extensive dissenting judgement.

Further, there are those who do not view the lack of available dissenting judgments as an obstacle in the preparation of a client’s defence. This is because, ‘Malaysian lawyers ...
they don’t stop at the legal journals…[they] look towards judgments, judicial judgments from India, from the UK, from Commonwealth countries as well…I don’t stop short at our legal positions in Malaysia’.  

(b) Discovery

Pursuant to s 51A of the CPC the prosecution is required to share the following documents with the defence:

- a copy of the information made under s 107 relating to the commission of the offence to which the accused is charged, if any;
- a copy of any document which would be tendered as part of the evidence for the prosecution; and
- a written statement of facts favourable to the defence of the accused signed under the hand of the Public Prosecutor or any person conducting the prosecution.

Notwithstanding the above, there are some notable deficiencies in s 51A. First, there is no time prescribed as to when the documents must be given to the defence, simply that it must be before the commencement of the trial. This creates the possibility for documents to be handed to the defence on the day of their trial, which in practice results in the prosecution case not being effectively tested due to insufficient time to consider the evidence as a whole and seek expertise opinion where required.

Second, is s 51A(2), which states that the prosecution may not supply any fact favourable to the accused if its supply would be contrary to the public interest. The vague wording of the phrase ‘public interest’ means that evidence that is favourable to the defence can be withheld under almost any circumstance, which is profoundly incompatible with the concept of a fair trial.

A discovery process that does comply with a fair trial process is one that requires the prosecution to provide evidence to the accused that it will be using in presenting its case, as well as providing the accused with exculpatory evidence, that is, evidence that is supportive of a defence. This is largely linked back to the prosecution’s duty to obtain justice rather than obtain a conviction.

In practice, it appears that the provision of relevant prosecutorial evidence is complied with ‘most of the time’. However, even if the documents are not provided, lawyers do not appear to necessarily see the value in making an application under s 51A of the CPC due to the low threshold required for compliance by the prosecution. Datuk Baljit Singh explains that the main justification for this is ‘because their evidence is nothing much, investigating officer with the arresting officer… the photographer, the chemist, nothing’.

Chan Yen Hui, in her interview, also supports the view that the prosecution makes insufficient discovery:

…documents given to us are very limited like the photographs, the accused’s statements…the post-mortem report … Like for example witnesses’ statements we don’t get it. So, I would say that it is not sufficient. Because you have eyewitnesses, all these statements are not given to us. How many eyewitnesses, we also do not know. And even what happened in … the process of discovery. We do not have all this information.
Fahri Azzat also comments on the limitations of the documents provided by prosecution:

…in theory under s51A of the Criminal Procedure Code, [the prosecution] are supposed to give us a set of documents. Alright. ... So, they do give you a set, but usually it’s not complete. Yeah? So, I don’t think I’ve ever gotten a nice 100 percent pack where they didn’t have to supplement it after that. You know? Maybe you get between anything between 60–90 percent of the documents that they will tender in court. But not all of it, of course. I would say, our sense of equality of arms we call it right, that means the prosecution/ defence should have more or less the same material, they should have theoretically the same resources and all that kind of nonsense, but doesn’t happen here. So, for example, we can’t ask for witness statements from or statements taken by prosecution during investigation or police during investigation for, for us to read. This is unlike UK, Australia, South Africa, where they have to give. They have to disclose whatever preparation they did for bringing the prosecution – it’s available for the defence as well.104

Thus, it appears that in respect of the disclosure of prosecutorial evidence, and the discovery process more broadly, further change is needed. According to Fahri Azzat, such change may be cultural:

…even though we adopted the Commonwealth system, we didn’t quite adapt their mentality. In a sense, that didn’t follow. So, we got the rules, we didn’t quite all get the principle … we just went down the course of [non-disclosure].105

Notwithstanding, Fahri Azzat heralds the introduction of s 51A of the CPC as a significant step:

… I would say it’s a huge step from where we used to be. Before that, you don’t get anything. You get your charge sheet, your client’s s 113 statement, and [that’s it].106

### 3.3 Right to have Adequate Time and Facility to Prepare a Defence and Communicate with Counsel of the Accused’s Own Choosing

Under Art. 5(3) of the Federal Constitution, a detained person has the right to be ‘informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice’.

Additionally, the right to communicate with counsel arises upon arrest and police officers are under restrictions to facilitate and not deny that right pursuant to s 28A of the CPC. For example, detained persons are entitled to request to consult with a legal practitioner, and that legal practitioner is similarly entitled to be present to meet with their client; police must ensure reasonable time is allowed to do so, in circumstances where the communication will not be overhead.107 The police must also provide reasonable facilities for the communication to take place without cost to the detained person.108 The police must not question or record the making of a statement from a detained person.109

There is, however, a significant limitation on the right to communicate in s 28A of the CPC, which is that there is no need for compliance if the police officer reasonably believes that:

- compliance will result in the detained person taking steps to avoid apprehension, the concealment or involvement with evidence or a witness; or
These rights or guarantees also appear to be enshrined in international instruments, including those other than Art. 14 of the ICCPR. For example, the right to counsel is included under the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, particularly principle 17 generally and principle 18 (which provides for confidential communication and adequate facilities for consultation to take place). While this seems to be in tandem with Malaysian procedural requirements, the reality is that ‘Malaysian authorities have paid little heed to the requirements of international law’ or domestic guarantees.

A lack of access to, or communication with, counsel will severely limit the fair trial rights of accused persons. This right ‘is an element in the larger jurisprudence of natural justice, encapsulated in the larger right to a fair hearing’ including the ‘chance to be heard and the opportunity to present the best case’.

3.4 Right to Choose Legal Assistance, and if Unable to Select Legal Assistance, the Right to State-provided Legal Assistance

a) Effective Counsel

The right to effective counsel is set out in the ICCPR, the Death Penalty Safeguards and the United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid (‘Principles on Legal Aid’). The expectation is that the adequate assistance of counsel will be adhered to ‘above and beyond the protection afforded in non-capital cases’, and if a capital defendant cannot afford a lawyer this must be provided by the state. These standards should be adhered to during: detention, preliminary stages of proceedings, at trial, during appeal, upon constitutional court review and throughout the clemency process.

The ICCPR suggests that the accused should have the right to be represented by counsel of their choice. This right applies even if it means that a hearing has to be adjourned. The Principles on Legal Aid, and the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, establish that where an accused does not have counsel of choice or cannot bear the costs themselves, they should still have the right to be assisted by legal counsel. In these circumstances, the Standards suggest that the State should bear the cost and have sufficient resources to provide effective counsel for the accused.

In the decision of Robinson v Jamaica, the Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) found that death penalty cases should not continue until the right to effective counsel has been satisfied. Effective counsel refers to a legal representative that is ‘competent, [and] has the requisite skills and experience commensurate with the gravity of the offence’. Where counsel is found not to be effective and state authorities become aware of this, the HRC case of Pinot v Trinidad & Tobago suggested that where Counsel are unable to perform their duties effectively, the Court should replace Counsel or ensure their effectiveness.

110. Ibid s 28A(8).
112. Ibid 34. See also Sahr Muhammed Ally ‘Convicted Before Trial: Indefinite Detention Under Malaysia’s Emergency Ordinance’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006) 16.
116. Death Penalty Safeguards [1(a)].
118. Principles Legal Aid, Principle 3.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
b) Counsel of Choice

Pursuant to Art. 5(3) of the Federal Constitution, a person who is arrested shall be informed of their grounds of arrest and ‘shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice’.124 Similarly, s 28A of CPC (as referred to above) entitles arrested persons to choose their legal practitioner. For those facing the death penalty, Chan Yen Hui, a lawyer interviewed for this report, states that ‘all … cases are entitled to free legal aid’, in the sense of court assigned pro bono legal representation.125

A practical challenge, however, is that the funding of legal aid lawyers is insufficient, which can impact on the way in which the rights of prisoners are protected and how accused can prepare an effective case. The resources assigned to a legal aid lawyer are approximately RM 6000, an amount described by a lawyer as ‘pittance’126 for the entirety of the case from the first trial to the final appeal. Shashi Devan Thalmalingam, a lawyer with 9 years’ experience on death penalty matters, states that the:

… fees are reviewed and increased. But it’s still not enough, it covers disbursements. But no way is it even at the minimum level of legal fees for a lawyer, private lawyer handling a death-penalty case…Whether it’s sufficient, there is some money. It is sufficient to cover cost but definitely I wouldn’t call it legal fees.127

As it is not possible to obtain sufficient legal aid funding for all of the requisite stages required to adequately defend an accused (the preliminary stages of proceedings, detention, pre-trial preparation, trial, and appeal) the provision of legal aid does not conform either to the requisite international standards, or Art. 5 of the Federal Constitution.128

One example of an issue that flows from the limited funding available for legal aid is the inability for defence counsel to obtain adequate independent expert witnesses. The prosecution, funded by the State, is well resourced and has access to a range of expert witnesses if need be. For the defence, challenging such expert witnesses may be difficult, if not impossible, if independent expert witnesses are not obtained.

For example, in an interview conducted for this report, lawyer Fahri Azzat states that:

When you say defending them to the best of my abilities, I can’t do that simply because we don’t have a budget for it. It’s really down to how much I am willing to put on my own money and feeling like this is worthwhile. But it’s difficult because for example we don’t get specialist evidence, we can’t hire an expert. Expert[s] cost at least a grand a day to come and give evidence, never mind their report. Never mind the time they spent preparing that report. So, you know we’re looking to at least easily 5 to 10 thousand to come up with a specialist report.

This discrepancy of resourcing undermines the principle of ‘equality in arms’, a principle that requires parties to have a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case in conditions that do not disadvantage one of them against the other.129

c) Appeal Representation

The right to representation is also significant when an incarcerated person seeks to exercise his or her appeal rights. The Human Rights Committee has stated that the denial of legal aid to an accused facing the death sentence would constitute a violation of the right to appeal.130
If an appellant is unable to fund their own counsel, the Principles on Legal Aid provide the accused with the right to legal aid when applying for pardon or commutation. In Malaysia, there is limited legal aid available at the clemency stage, due in part to sparse funding schemes and inadequate communication by prison officials of legal aid access to inmates.

3.5 Right to be Tried Without Undue Delay

The right to be tried without delay is an entrenched right in many jurisdictions. For example, in England and Wales, the right is established at common law, most notably in the decision of Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1990). At the international level, Art. 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR is often cited as establishing the right for an accused to be tried without delay.

The length of time that constitutes delay is not defined, and reasonable time is determined by evaluating the circumstances of each case. The complexity of the case, conduct of the accused, severity of the charges and potential penalties are all relevant factors in establishing what would constitute an ‘undue delay’.

The UN Human Rights Committee has provided examples of scenarios where the right to be tried without delay had been breached. This includes cases where:

- there was one week between arrest and bringing the accused before a judge;
- the accused was held in detention for 16 months prior to trial; and
- there were 31 months between the trial and the dismissal of the appeal.

It should be noted here that the need for a speedy trial does not justify a breach of fair trial standards that would be inconsistent with the rights of the accused.

In Malaysia, Art. 5(1) of the Federal Constitution provides that no one ‘shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law’. In Public Prosecutor v Choo Chuan Wang, Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) cited several Indian Supreme Court decisions in holding that Art. 5(1) of the Federal Constitution be interpreted in favour of an accused person being accorded the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time, by an impartial Court established by law.

The right to a trial without undue delay is not entrenched in Malaysian statute, however, there are a number of ad hoc pieces of legislation that refer to unreasonable delay. For example, s 42 of the CPC requires persons arrested ought to be brought before courts without delay. Additionally, s 117 of the CPC stipulates that an accused is not to be held in custody for an excessive period of time without charge. An arrested person may not be held for a period of over twenty-four hours, if it is believed that the investigation could not be completed during that period of time. However, this period may be extended on application to a magistrate under s 117(2) of the CPC for a period which is reasonable in the circumstances, with consideration being given to the complexity and serious nature of offences punishable by death.

Delay can occur through a number of stages throughout the criminal justice process. First, pre-trial; trial itself; appeal process; and finally the clemency process. Lengthy delays can have a significant effect on the accused from a mental health perspective, due to the stress placed upon them and from a social and economic standpoint.
3.6 Right to Have an Interpreter and Translation

The right to an interpreter is particularly significant for those accused persons who belong to ethnic minorities, are foreign nationals or otherwise do not speak Bahasa Melayu (the national language of Malaysia, and formal language used in the courts). Foreign nationals, or non-citizens, are overrepresented in the Malaysian death row population. Amnesty International reports that as of February 2019, 44% of persons sentenced to death are foreign nationals and, of those foreign nationals 49% are convicted of drug-trafficking.142

In 1991, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (‘Vienna Convention’) was acceded by Malaysia. Pursuant to the Vienna Convention member states are required to, without delay, inform the consular post of a State whose citizen has been ‘arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other matter’.143 In reality, ‘there is considerable variation in state practices as regards the assistance given’ and limited information available regarding the protections in place for foreign nationals outside the jurisdiction of their country of nationality.144 Thus, foreign nationals are denied critical support from their consulate, often in the vital and early stages in the criminal proceedings, in their own language.145

The Principles on Legal Aid also suggest that an interpreter should be provided for defendants who do not speak or understand the language used by authorities.146 That interpreter should be independent from the authorities. The European Court of Human Rights found that translations should be provided for any key written document that the accused needs to understand to ensure a fair trial.147

In Malaysia, the CPC requires courts to ensure trial proceedings are understood by the accused. For example, s 270(1) establishes the right of an accused to an interpreter’s translation of evidence presented in a language they do not understand;148 and under s 256(8), questions put to the accused must be in a language the accused understands.149 However, during court proceedings, it is at the court’s discretion as to whether documentary material must be translated to the accused.150 Importantly, the right to an interpreter is only entrenched during the trial procedure, and not during preliminary police investigation.

Our research confirms that the Malaysian framework and process may not be providing the minimal protections offered to foreign nationals. For example, the fact that interpreters are provided to accused persons only in the courtroom means that foreign nationals are not adequately supported outside the courtroom. In fact, ‘[m]any foreign nationals are...’

Case Study

Between 2009-2010, a number of Iranian nationals were arrested in Malaysia for drug trafficking in contravention of the DDA. The defendants indicated that they had been duped into carrying drugs by smugglers who had promised significant financial rewards or a funded trip to Malaysia. They were sentenced to the death penalty and as of October 2017 were being held in the Kajang prison in confinement. One of the prisoners, stated that:

…we were arrested at Malaysia’s airport and the next day a Pakistani translator came and we realised that we were carrying meth. The translator they sent us was Pakistani and didn’t know Persian very well. The [Iranian] embassy didn’t do anything about it either. At the time, we had to pay 20 to 30 million Tomans…to get a lawyer which we didn’t have. Therefore, we got a public defender and were sentenced to death. The third council of the embassy got one lawyer for 20-30 of us and he handled the case carelessly which didn’t have a different result.151
arrested for drug-related crimes and...are not necessarily provided with immediate and professional interpretation during the crucial hour of police investigation and interrogation, rendering confession based on misrepresentation and/or induced by the investigating officer". 152

Even if an accused person is provided with an interpreter in the courtroom, there is a concern that he or she may be unable to understand the legal process (e.g. the charge, consequences or penalty, the evidence presented and the court process), particularly in a jurisdiction foreign to them. For example, Interviewee 1, a lawyer interviewed for this report, notes that in the case of foreign nationals you ‘don’t know whether they are given interepreters, or if they understand the law... How are the accused to know what’s happening exactly’.153

3.7 Privilege Against Self-incrimination

Accused persons have the right to remain silent at trial, which is recognised at both the pre-trial and trial stage under international standards,154 including the UDHR by implication.155 As noted above, Malaysia observes the rights enshrined by the UDHR by reason of its membership as a member of the UN.156 While there is no express provision under Malaysian domestic legislation such as the CPC, the right to remain silent is implied from Art. 5 of the Federal Constitution and s 173(ha) of the CPC.157

The privilege against self-incrimination exists in the common law jurisdictions,158 and is critical in ‘minimis[ing] the risk of convicting the innocent, but it has taken a different turn in Malaysia’.159 Rather, the privilege (or silence) is arguably exploited by the prosecution to establish its case on a prima facie basis, which the Malaysian judiciary seems to allow. This is most clearly demonstrated by the ruling of the Federal Court in 2006, which explained that:

...if the accused elects to remain silent he must be convicted. The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of a reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt, there can be no prima facie case.160

So, while an accused person does have the right to remain silent to avoid self-incrimination under common law, in practice, exercising this right can result in an automatic conviction. This is because in remaining silent, the accused fails to establish a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. However, this arguably undermines the principle of judicial independence in that where an accused wishes to remain silent, trial judges will immediately conclude that their silence warrants a conviction. This seems to be the effect of s 173(h)(iii) of the CPC. In reality, however, an accused person’s ‘silence should be treated individually and not to represent the absence of evidence in the defence case as a whole’.161

This is exacerbated in drug trafficking cases because of the operation of the DDA ‘double presumptions’, where the accused is required to rebut a presumption which is in stark contradiction to the right to remain silent. This is discussed in detail in Part 4 below.

More importantly, the Malaysian legislature should consider inserting a mechanism to guarantee accused persons facing criminal charges are a statutory entitlement to the privilege against self-incrimination.
3.8 Right to Appeal Conviction and Sentence

The Death Penalty Safeguards state that the death penalty may only be carried out after a final judgment by a competent court.\(^\text{162}\) To satisfy this requirement, every person convicted and sentenced to death must be entitled to exercise the right to a review of both their conviction and sentence,\(^\text{163}\) to be heard by a higher, independent, impartial and competent tribunal.\(^\text{164}\) This is an integral part of the judicial system and is instrumental in ensuring justice and fairness for the accused. In Malaysia, legislative mechanisms exist for convicted persons to seek a revision of the imposed sentence and/or an appeal of the decision.

(a) Appeal

The description of the appellate process for convicted criminals is limited in Malaysian statute. A prisoner may appeal their sentence from the High Court to the Court of Appeal.\(^\text{165}\) After the Court of Appeal determines whether the appeal may be made, the judge who passed the sentence of death forwards a report on the case with the Federal Court, which determines the ultimate outcome.\(^\text{166}\) It should be noted as per s 287(1) of the \textit{CPC}, a sentence of death may not be carried out if an appeal is made and until such time as the sentence of death is confirmed by the appellate court. This is consistent with provisions of the \textit{Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Malaysia)} (‘CJA’) which expressly prohibits the execution of a sentence of death or corporal punishment until notice of appeal is given and after the determination of the appeal, in the case of criminal appeals.\(^\text{167}\) During the period 2007 to 2017, there were 128 cases pending in the Federal Court (appeal applications) compared to 442 before the Board of Pardons (clemency applications).\(^\text{168}\)

Additionally, the right to appeal to the High Court to the Court of Appeal is considered to be an ‘automatic’ right.\(^\text{169}\) In practice, however, this may not be the case. For example, in an interview for this report, lawyer, Mohd Haijan Omar stated that ‘the law says right of appeal you need 14 days from the date of decision. This is a criminal appeal...If you don’t file your appeal within the specified time, the next course of actions is to get a breach … get it extended’.\(^\text{170}\)

Mohd Haijan Omar went on to give an example of a matter he had been working on reflecting the consequences of failing to appeal within the specified time:

…a boy who was charged for an offence that happened in 2002 (I think). He was 14 years old. He was alleged to have killed his employer, and in the process also killed, a 2 year old boy I think. Then...a court assigned lawyer was appointed to him...not much was done for the trial. There’s no Record of Appeal. There are no notes of proceedings taken by the judge ... He was too young, 14 years old, did not know what happened to him all knew he was guilty. So, the lawyer did not file an appeal for him. When he was brought to prison, the prison officers they all talk to him against it. They all said you know you did it, might as well don’t appeal. So, he was guilt-ridden and he did not file an appeal. Ended in the High Court. He’s been there for 18 years now. He’s not been pardoned, not been reviewed, although he’s a child. So, what I’m saying...is that it is not automatic.\(^\text{171}\)

It should be noted that while judicial appeals have to be prepared rapidly, both the outcome and the process of the appeal can be lengthy and arduous. Chan Yen Hui, a lawyer who was interviewed for the purpose of this report, states that:
we have like one month to appeal. Once we filed the appeal, the Court of Appeal may take a few months, maybe 7–8 months so they would be like seven, eight months waiting. At that point of time, most of these convicted accused they are still happy to wait. Because they are waiting for this Court of Appeal decision. After the Court of Appeal decides the case, then we have another one month to appeal to the Federal Court. So again, it will take like 6–7 months so, then the matter proceeds to the Federal Court...[then] awaiting clemency, 6 –7 years now...usually execution will only take years later.172

When interviewed, Datuk Baljit Singh stated that ‘from the date he’s charged the court of first instance you ... give yourself one year. One to one and a half years, maximum...Then to the Court of Appeal you give another year. Maximum...Then Federal Court another one year. So total, three and a half years.’173

Further, Seira Sacha Abu Bakar noted that the appeal process ‘can go up until 5 years I think...review from the day you’re convicted, probably take about five years.’174

Another complication is the fact that the appeals are conducted in paper form. For example, Seira Sacha Abu Bakar explains that:

... you don’t get sight of the accused’s body language...When you do the trial case one of the challenges is you don’t get to see the demeanour of the witnesses. You can only read but you don’t know whether what he’s stating is correct or not...the other is when you don’t get the grounds of judgment...which makes you unable to proceed.175

Therefore, although Malaysia has a right to appeal that theoretically conforms with international standards, the issues discussed above indicate that there is a potential for injustice in a way that undermines the objectives of the international standards.

(b) Revision

The superior courts of Malaysia are conferred specific revisionary powers. Pursuant to s 31 of the CJA, the High Court has discretionary revisionary power over criminal proceedings including questions of criminal procedure arising from the subordinate courts. Similarly, both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court have express powers of revision to quash, substitute or vary sentences.176

However, it is very rare for an appeal court to overturn a death penalty sentence as the threshold to do so is very high. During the period 2007 to 2017, only 165 of the 1,267 of death row inmates in Malaysia were successful in their application for a sentence reduction.177 For example, in the matter of Mainthan Arumugam, the Federal Court refused to entertain the application for review due to new evidence, demonstrating its preference not to reopen a death penalty case despite the reappearance of the alleged victim. This case pertains to a death penalty imposed for an alleged murder and demonstrates an extreme example of the failings of the process. The alleged victim, Devadas, was located 13 years after Arumugam was sentenced to death for his murder and the victim signed a statement confirming that he was not in fact murdered. Arumugam’s lawyer, Amer Hamzah, reflected in an interview with the media on the failed appeal stating that he was ‘struck by the many unanswered questions’ and the reappearance of the victim, which constituted a gap in the evidence which led to his client’s conviction. The effect is that this high threshold for review leaves ‘Malaysia’s death row inmates ... in limbo’.178

172. Interview with Miss Chan Yin Hui (Dr Thaatchaayini Kanamuthu & Janice Ananthar, Monash University, Malaysia, 30 December 2020).
173. Interview with Datuk Baljit Singh Sidhu (Dr Thaatchaayini Kanamuthu & Janice Ananthar, Wisma Shukorbaljit, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2 January 2020).
174. Interview with Miss Seira Sacha Abu Bakar (Dr Thaatchaayini Kanamuthu & Janice Ananthar, Seira & Sharizad, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 25 February 2020).
175. ibid.
176. CJA ss 62(2), 92(2).
(c) Clemency

Persons who receive a sentence of death have the right to seek pardon or commutation of their sentence under Article 6(4) of the ICCPR and paragraph 7 of the Death Penalty Safeguards. In Malaysia, a person sentenced to death has the right to petition for pardon (which constitutes a form of clemency).179 This right to seek clemency is automatic,180 and the power to grant clemency rests with the Board of Pardons which consists of the Attorney-General, the Federal Territories Minister and three other lay members appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Head of State).181 After consideration of the opinion of the Federal Attorney-General, the Board must then advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong about the appropriateness of a pardon.182

Unfortunately, the Malaysian process does not appear to be transparent and at times, it can in fact be described as arbitrary.183 This is because the clemency process has no clear legal framework, as it falls within the ambit of the Executive rather than the Judiciary.184 This is problematic in the three ways.

First, there are political representatives serving on the Board of Pardons which enables the federal government to indirectly participate in the decision-making of the Board of Pardons, which should be an independent constitutional advisory body. For example, the applicant for clemency is entitled to provide written but not oral submissions, whereas the report of the Attorney-General must be considered by the Board of Pardons,185 and can participate both through written and oral means. This has been criticised by the Malaysian Bar for undermining the doctrine of separation powers.186 This is particularly concerning since the Attorney-General acts as both prosecutor and advisor. According to lawyer Datuk N Sivananthan who was interviewed for this report:

The problem is lawyers are not allowed to appear at those hearing and I think that’s very unsatisfactory. Because you are going to have a bunch of people from the prosecution there, then you have some other members of the board. So to me, the moment you have a prosecutor there without defence is grossly unfair. So I think the Pardon’s Board itself should not include the prosecutor. They can have the board and if they want to hear the representation the both prosecution and defence should be allowed to make representation.187

Second, the Board of Pardons rarely meets,188 which means that petitioners do not have the opportunity to present their case before the Board, and the Board is not required to disclose the explanation for its decision. This is compounded by the fact there is no time limit prescribed by Malaysian statute by which the Board of Pardons must render its decision on the clemency application.189 It is common for clemency applicants to wait on death row for at least 10 years but there are also cases where persons convicted of drug-trafficking waited for 22 years.190 Delay is of particular concern for death row prisoners, who have experienced lengthy delays over a number of years post trial. They are subject to a ‘unique psychological impact on prisoners of long periods under the harsh conditions of death row, with the ever-present shadow of execution hanging over them’191 known as the ‘death row phenomenon’. Isolation and years of uncertainty can have a detrimental effect on a prisoner’s mental and physical state. In and of itself, death row phenomenon has been recognised as a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. For example, the European Court of Human Rights held that prolonged detention of prisoners on death row is considered as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.192
Third, the outcome of the clemency process cannot be reviewed. In *Karpal Sing v Sultan of Selangor*, it was held that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is not bound to act on the advice of the Pardons Board and is permitted to exercise their discretion in the prerogative of mercy, and the decision of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is not reviewable in court.193

However, beyond this process, there is no legal framework in place that outlines the process in detail, nor are there criteria set out as to how pardon decisions should be considered or communicated.

It should also be noted that, in the case of a clemency request, there is no legislative scheme which prescribes the minimum time requirements between sentence and execution.194 While s 281(c) of the CPC provides that persons granted a pardon cannot be executed, there is no specific safeguard resulting in a stay of execution caused by the making of a clemency application, pending before the Board of Pardons. In theory, executions will not take place until clemency is considered.195 However, in practice, pardon applications rarely have an effect on the stay of an execution. For example, of the four known executions in 2017, two were carried out while the petitioners’ clemency requests were pending.196 This conflicts with international standards for fair trial rights which calls for States to allow sufficient time between the imposition of a death sentence and the execution.197 Adequate time should be provided to enable the prisoner to prepare their appeals and petitions for clemency, and to address any personal matters.

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**Case Study**

In 2006, clemency was granted to Chu Tak Fai, a British national who had been sentenced to death in Malaysia.198 Chu Tak Fai was convicted on 11 October 1994 by the High Court for trafficking in cannabis, thus contravening s 39B of the DDA. He was unsuccessful with his appeals before the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court.199 However, the Board of Pardons was reportedly convinced to grant clemency given that Chu Tak Fai had been ‘forced to smuggle drugs into Malaysia from Thailand by a money-laundering group to whom his family owed a significant debt’.200 Chu Tak Fai spent a total of 12 years on death row before clemency was finally granted in the form of a commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment.
Drug Offences and the Death Penalty in Malaysia

Drug use and drug trafficking are global phenomena that transcend jurisdictional borders. Malaysia is no exception and notwithstanding a punitive approach to drug related offences, drug use and drug trafficking appears to persist unabated. The issue is perhaps more challenging largely because of Malaysia’s close proximity to the Golden Triangle; it is treated as a “transit country for drug traffickers from the Golden Triangle to other destinations”.201

In response to the difficulties posed by increased drug trafficking and drug dependence, ‘Malaysia began its drug war in 1975 when it first prescribed the death penalty for drug trafficking’.202 This punitive ‘war on drugs’ approach to criminalising drug related activities is reflected in Malaysia’s criminal law framework today, in particular by the DDA, which is of most concern to this report.

In Malaysia, drug-trafficking remains the primary offence that attracts the death penalty.203 As at December 2019, of the 1280 persons on death row; 899 were convicted pursuant to s 39B of the DDA (70%) and 546 were foreign nationals (43%).204 Amnesty International reports that over two thirds of foreign nationals were convicted for contravening s 39B of the DDA205 and although no executions have been carried out since 2017, the death penalty for drug trafficking continues to be routinely imposed.206 The following Table 4 indicates the executions and imposition of death sentences in Malaysia from 2013–2019:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Executions of Persons Charged under s 39B DDA</th>
<th>No. of Executions of Persons Charged with Capital Offences</th>
<th>No. of Convictions of Persons Charged with Capital Offences</th>
<th>No. of Convictions of Persons Charged under s 39B DDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0²⁰⁸</td>
<td>26²⁰⁹</td>
<td>12²¹⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0²¹¹</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0²¹²</td>
<td>38+</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4²¹³</td>
<td>14+</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0²¹⁴</td>
<td>39+</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>2²¹⁵</td>
<td>38+</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>0²¹⁶</td>
<td>76+</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whilst the rate of executions has slowed down in the last 7 years, the substantial increase in the reporting of death penalty sentences being imposed in 2018 can be attributed to official data being made available to Amnesty International, whereas previous figures came through Amnesty International’s monitoring of the Courts and media.217

4.1 Malaysian Legislative Framework: Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA’)

Pursuant to s 39B(1) of the DDA, it is an offence punishable by death for an accused to traffic in a dangerous drug, offer to traffic a dangerous drug, or do or offer to do a peremptory act for the purpose of trafficking in a dangerous drug. Prior to November 2017, convictions under s 39B attracted the mandatory death penalty. However, the November 2017 amendments allowed a discretionary element to sentencing judges; an accused who now contravenes s 39B(1) shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall, if not sentenced to death, be punished with whipping of not less than fifteen strokes.218

205. Giada Girelli, ‘Report to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime on the Tenth survey on capital punishment and on the implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty, covering the period 2014-2016’, Harm Reduction International Report, 13 September 2019 8.
207. These figures have been reported by Amnesty International. Amnesty International, ‘Fатally Flawed’ in 17 15-6. These are minimum figures. The symbol ‘+’ represents the fact that there is no data available to determine exactly how many executions took place for that year or how many sentences are imposed (i.e. ‘unknown’ data).
212. Ibid.
214. Ibid.
216. Ibid.
218. DDA s 39B(2).
The introduction of discretionary sentencing for drug trafficking offences was the culmination of significant campaigning from the Malaysian Bar, non-Government organisations and civil society groups over a number of years. Datuk Seri Azalina Othman, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department at the time, who moved the legislation stated that ‘[t]he government had taken into consideration the views and suggestions of 30 million Malaysians in drafting the amendment which will add an element of mercy in a certain situation where the judge sees fit’.219

Although this provision appears to permit sentencing judges a discretion as to whether or not to impose the death penalty, the discretion is limited by s 39B(2A) of the DDA which states that when imposing a sentence of imprisonment for life and whipping of not less than fifteen strokes, the Court may have regard only to the following circumstances:

(a) there was no evidence of buying and selling of a dangerous drug at the time when the person convicted was arrested;
(b) there was no involvement of agent provocateur; or
(c) the involvement of the person convicted is restricted to transporting, carrying, sending or delivering a dangerous drug; and
(d) that the person convicted has assisted an enforcement agency in disrupting drug trafficking activities within or outside Malaysia.

The problematic implications arising from the drafting of this section are significant and will be discussed below. However it is suggested that a result of these drafting limitations, mandatory sentencing for drug offending largely remains in place.

4.2 Unclear Wording

Subsections 39B(2A)(a)-(d) of the DDA set out four circumstances in which a court may exercise discretion not to impose the death sentence. It is clear that subsection (d), being the requirement to provide prosecutorial assistance, is required in every circumstance as it is prefaced with the word ‘and’. However, the application of the other subsections is more ambiguous. For example, subsection (a) is not followed by any direction of ‘and’ or ‘or’ whereas subsection (b) is followed by the direction ‘or’. It is unclear as to whether an accused must satisfy subsection (a), (b) together with (d), or (a) together with (d), or (b) together with (d) or (a) and (c) together with (d) or (c) and (d).

The Explanatory Statement does not clarify this point as it states merely that “the Court may have regard only to any of the circumstances specified in the proposed new paragraph 39B(2A)(a), (b) or (c)”,220 and the subsection that became (d). Given that this subsection is the only avenue for discretionary sentencing in the entire DDA, the lack of clarity may result in a mandatory sentence being imposed due to misinterpretation of the legislative options rather than the non existence of a factual circumstance.

4.3 Enforcement Agencies Inadvertently Gaining a Judicial Power

Subsection 39B(2A)(d) requires that ‘the person convicted has assisted an enforcement agency in disrupting drug trafficking activities within or outside Malaysia’.

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220. Explanatory Statement, Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Bill 2017 (Malaysia) 3-4.
Whilst the determination of whether this section has been satisfied is a judicial decision, it requires Malaysian enforcement agencies to give evidence in support of the level assistance provided by the accused. However, it is unclear exactly which elements have to be established in order to demonstrate the drug trafficking activities have been disrupted. Due to the confidential and covert nature of prosecutorial investigations, this information is not likely to be available to an individual accused. In practice, the burden of proof is reversed as it falls on the accused to establish their level of assistance which undermines their right to the presumption of innocence.

Importantly, whilst the option of discretionary sentencing was aimed at allowing those on the lower level of drug offending a reprieve from the death penalty, the mandatory requirement to satisfy the Court of (d) means that those offenders who have less involvement with criminal activity (for example, those who have been forced or tricked into participating) may not be able to offer information that can assist ‘disrupting drug trafficking activities’. This is because they simply do not have the level of information required to discharge this reverse-burden.

### 4.4 ‘Double Presumption’ Burden

Section 37 of the DDA contains a presumption that an accused who is found in possession of a *traffickable amount* of a drug of dependence is in fact *trafficking* in the said drug. This means that potentially an accused may be sentenced to death for drug trafficking on what is commonly referred to as a ‘double presumption’. The effect of these presumptions is that an accused is effectively ‘guilty until proven innocent, in violation of one of the most fundamental tenets of the right to fair trial.’

Under s 37 of the DDA, the prosecution is entitled to rely on statutory presumptions that either deem the accused to be in possession of a drug of dependence or be to trafficking in a drug of dependence. For example, s 37(b) allows the prosecution to rely on the deeming provision to prove that the drug was on land or premises occupied by the accused; that is to prove that the accused had custody and control of the drug. Section 37(d) allows the prosecution to presume that an accused had knowledge of the nature of the drug and as such, was in possession of the drug. Such deeming provisions typically shift the burden on to the accused to disprove the requisite elements on a balance of probabilities.

The ‘double presumptions’ enshrined in s 37 of the DDA have been described as a ‘complex system … has the effect of shifting a part of the burden of proof in a trafficking case to the accused’, Their application has been the subject of contention in a number of Malaysian decisions, as discussed in Part 4.6 and Appendix II below.

In the context of drug trafficking, the presumption of innocence is undermined because as a result of the double presumptions accused are presumed to be guilty. As discussed above in Part 3, the burden of proof generally lies with the prosecution, but that is not the case in practice since the threshold is merely ‘on a prima facie basis’, rather than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. According to the former Chief Justice Richard Malanjum in the decision of *Atienza*, s 37A of the DDA violates the presumption of innocence as the provision allows for the possibility to convict an accused despite the possibility of reasonable doubt: ‘we consider that s 37A constitutes a most substantial departure from the general rule which cannot be justified by and is disproportionate to the legislative objectives it serves’.
The effect of Atienza is that s 37A can offend the requirements of fairness under Arts. 5 and 8 of the Federal Constitution. The effect of the provision is to ‘revers[e] the burden onto an accused to prove his or her innocence’ and, ‘where double presumptions are applied… the burden on the appellants to rebut both presumptions on the balance of probabilities is oppressive, unduly harsh and unfair’.226 The Federal Court concluded that ‘s 37A is unconstitutional for violating Art. 5(1) read with Art. 8(1) of the [Constitution]’ and for this reason, the Court struck s 37A down. This is because ‘the application of what may be termed the “double presumptions” … gives rise to a real risk that an accused may be convicted of drug trafficking in circumstances where a significant reasonable doubt remains as to the main elements of the offence’.227 The convictions of the appellants for trafficking were quashed under s 39B DDA, and substituted for possession, punishable under s 39A(2) DDA. This is because while there was no reasonable doubt as to possession of drugs, there was a reasonable doubt as to trafficking.

By striking down s 37A, it is clear that the Federal Court, in interpreting the DDA presumptions, is not willing to allow the use of multiple presumptions to support the finding of a conviction of trafficking. Ultimately, these decisions demonstrate judicial support for the fact that each case ought to be determined on a case by case basis and that the application of generic presumptions can lead to erroneous outcomes. Further, as discussed above, the double presumptions may be unconstitutional as they undermine the presumption of innocence.

Despite the fact that the decision of Atienza was handed down in April 2019,228 the Malaysian Parliament has yet to address this ruling by amending the legislation. This means that accused are still being arraigned and convicted under a section of a statute that has been found to be unconstitutional and an unknown number of people convicted under this section remain on death row, deprived of their liberty.

4.5 Reforms are not Retroactive

It is concerning that the amendments to subsection 39B(2A) were not enacted to apply retrospectively. International law fair trial principles require that an accused convicted of a death penalty offence ought to be provided with the benefit of a lighter penalty for that crime, where such a penalty becomes available.229

Domestically, Art. 7 of the Federal Constitution states that accused shall not be punished for an offence, or suffer greater punishment for an offence unless such was prescribed by the law at the time the offence was committed. However, the Federal Constitution does not stipulate how laws should be applied if they are to potentially benefit the defendant or prisoner.

Case study

Issues with double presumptions are perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the 2016 decision of PP v Duangchit Khonhokhunburi229 whereby the High Court held that the statutory presumption of trafficking under s 37(d) DDA has the effect that the accused is deemed to be in possession of drugs. The case concerned a female foreign national of Thailand arrested at Kuala Lumpur International Airport for trafficking 2809g of methamphetamine. Her defence argued that the accused was not ‘in the act’ of carrying or importing drugs into Malaysia by reason of being ‘in transit’. In ascertaining the definition of ‘trafficking’ under s 2 DDA, the High Court concluded that the prosecution need only prove the accused was deemed to be in possession of the drugs on a prima facie basis for the purpose of s 37(d). Subsequently, once in possession of the prescribed statutory amount, the accused is deemed in law to be trafficking, regardless of the fact that he or she may not have intended to distribute or consume the drugs.
Notwithstanding, it was open to the Malaysian Parliament to enact reforms that benefit defendants or prisoners retrospectively and this point was raised at the time the Bill was debated in Parliament in November 2017. These amendments did not come into force until 15 March 2018 and in July 2018 a full moratorium on all executions was imposed. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the effect that the 2018 legislative change has had on sentencing practices due to the likelihood that most of the cases currently before the Court involve offending that took place prior to 15 March 2018.

Regardless of the lack of retrospectivity, the reality is that there are now a significant number of people sentenced to death mandatorily in circumstances where the Parliament has since recognised that lower level offenders should be spared execution.

### 4.6 Defence of Innocent Carrier

In the context of drug trafficking and the death penalty, there is a defence commonly raised by accused persons, that is, the defence of innocent carrier. A creature of the Malaysian common law, the defence is defined as ‘a state of affairs where an accused person acknowledges carrying for example a bag or a box … containing the dangerous drugs but disputes having knowledge of the drugs’. Whether the defence is successful is dependent upon the facts of each case.

Decisions examined below, and in Appendix 2, illustrate the way in which an accused may raise the defence. Typically, the focus is on the fact that their role in the conduct that attracted the drug trafficking charge was that of a ‘drug mule/carrier’; conduct that is presented by defence counsel as mitigating. The defence is particularly prevalent amongst those vulnerable members of the death-row population, notably foreign nationals who are female (e.g. female migrant workers). These people are targeted by drug-trafficking syndicates ‘because they are typically poor and uneducated, but hold passports’. In fact, it is estimated that at least 30% of persons arrested for suspected drug-trafficking globally are women, ‘usually for low-level involvement, including as drug couriers/mules’. It should be noted that the defence is rarely accepted by trial judges in Malaysia in the context of drug trafficking and the death penalty. For example, in Table 5: Illustrative Cases Involving Capital Charges for Drug Trafficking Under s 39B DDA for the period 1978 to 2019, it appears that in 24 of the cases, the defence was raised 15 times but was never accepted.

Malaysian courts are often reluctant to accept the defence of innocent carrier suggesting that the defence is a ‘mere afterthought’, or that the conduct of the accused gives rise to wilful blindness. Wilful blindness arises where ‘a person deliberately shuts his eyes to the obvious, because he doesn’t want to know’; that person is ‘taken to know’. A person is not wilfully blind if and only if ‘there is no reason for suspicion and no right and opportunity of examination, and ignorance simpliciter is not enough’. In assessing the defence, the courts will assess the conduct of the accused even at the time of arrest. For example, fleeing the scene or resisting arrest can ‘whittle away the presumption of innocence’.

For example, in the decision *Kabunda Sakai Eddy v PP*, the High Court did not accept the defence of innocent courier, finding instead that the accused was guilty of wilful blindness. In so doing, the High Court rejected the accused’s plea that he had no knowledge of the substance contained within capsules he had swallowed, being methamphetamine. From his evidence, it became clear that the accused was recruited by a woman in Tanzania who instructed him to travel to Malaysia for a ‘work assignment’ and to swallow the capsules which he thought resembled African food. The High Court however held that the accused had all the opportunity to refuse to swallow...
the capsules. It was of the view that there was opportunity for the accused to inquire as to the substance of the capsules as his life and personal security was not threatened. It found that ultimately the accused ‘should have been wary’.

Further, the courts have also held that whether the ‘organiser’ of the drug scheme is fictitious or not, is often irrelevant in establishing whether the accused is an innocent carrier. Considering Kabunda Sakaii Eddy v PP, it is clear that the High Court did not include in its reasons (and thereby did not consider relevant) the existence of the woman who recruited the accused. Ultimately, it was held that the accused’s arguments did not rebut the presumption of knowledge required to establish the defence of innocent carrier. The irrelevance of the ‘recruiter’ seems, however, contrary to the ratio in Alcontara a/l Ambross Anthony v PP, which held that persons who wish to raise the defence of innocent carrier should ‘reveal the information about the so called real trafficker [at] the soonest possible’ time.

It also appears likely that prosecution submissions which rely on the double presumption under the DDA are not easily rebutted by the defence of innocent carrier. For example, the Court in Atienza found that the defence will not work if the accused has failed to perform their own investigations, even in circumstances where the prosecution has simply relied on the double presumptions to make out the elements of drug trafficking. Doing so may be particularly difficult for accused who do not have the resources and are in custody awaiting trial, or if the prosecution is not willing, or not under an obligation, to provide adequate discovery of the evidence.

Innocent Couriers: The Over-representation of Foreign Nationals and Women Prisoners on Death Row

As discussed above, foreign nationals are overrepresented in the Malaysian death row population. Amnesty International reports that 44% of persons sentenced to death are foreign nationals and, of those foreign nationals 49% have been convicted of drug-related offences.

Whilst women only comprise 11% of Malaysia’s total death row population, Amnesty International reports that 95% of females on death row have been sentenced for a drug-related crime and 86% of women on death row are foreign nationals. Importantly, it must be recognised that ‘[d]rug war discourse is profoundly gendered’ whereby the ‘drug war discourses establish the state as paternalistic protector’. In the context of ‘the female drug mule’, women traffickers are prima facie seen as ‘potential villains’ despite that ‘as women, they are potential victims’.

The cases below are representative of cases that concern foreign nationals and women prisoners, who have been sentenced to the death penalty for drug trafficking.
**PP v Huang Ziling [2017] MLJU 1582**

The accused, Huang Ziling ("Ziling"), was a female Chinese national charged with trafficking 1.4kg of methamphetamine under s.39B DDA. Ziling elected to give evidence on oath and stated that she was an unmarried girl from the Chinese Guangxi province. She submitted that her presence in Malaysia was her first overseas trip, prior to which she worked as a waitress in Guangzhou. She claimed that one of her customers was a Nigerian male called 'She Be' who, in or about November 2013, offered her a job with a monthly salary of 10,000 yuan to transport children’s items and clothing outside of China. In or about January 2014, She Be gave Ziling a luggage bag and instructed her to travel to Malaysia. She Be opened a small hole in the bag revealing a box of stationery but otherwise did not show Ziling what was inside the bag. She Be did not accompany Ziling to the airport.

Ziling’s main defence was that she was merely an innocent carrier who, given the nature of her employment and the description of her tasks by She Be, had no reason to suspect that the luggage contained illicit drugs. However, the Court found this to be a bare denial and that Ziling’s explanation was not credible. The defence did not raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case despite the fact that burden upon which Ziling was to rebut the statutory presumption of trafficking was on the balance of probabilities.

**PP v Hares Waeda-Oh [2018] 1 LNS 1383**

The accused was a Thai national who worked as a taxi driver and whose arrival in Malaysia was to collect passengers from the Kuala Perlis Pier. The accused gave evidence that the car was owned by a person called Mohd Shukri who instructed him to drive one passenger to the pier in February 2016 and to collect the passenger in March 2016. The accused used Mohd Shukri’s car and did not use his own taxi car as it could not withstand long journeys. The accused thus denied knowledge of the drugs hidden behind the passenger seat however the Court concluded that he should have checked before leaving Thailand whereby he would have discovered the illicit substances.

The Court arrived at this finding despite the fact that there was no evidence of any odour of cannabis in the car’s cabin. Additionally, the Court accepted the prosecution’s allegation that Mohd Shukri was a fictional character. The defendant’s lawyer did not raise the defence of innocent carrier.

**PP v Winfred To Make [2019] 1 LNS 1168**

Pursuant to s.39B DDA, the accused who was a Kenyan national was convicted for trafficking 818g of methamphetamine. The accused was arrested at Kuala Lumpur International Airport and argued that he had no knowledge of the drugs contained in the seized luggage. He submitted that his friend, Sharon, had asked him to do her a favour by delivering the luggage to her. He had no reason to be suspicious, particularly since the drugs were concealed and not visible to the naked eye. However, the Court found the defence was without merit and that the concealment of the drugs could not be considered in the defence in drug cases. This would enable those accused of drug trafficking to evade prosecution. The Court held that Sharon was a fictitious character and rejected the accused’s argument that he did not know Sharon well and that he did not receive compensation from Sharon. The Court did not accept the defence of innocent carrier finding instead that the accused was guilty of wilful blindness.

**Hu Yanyu v PP [2019] 1 LNS 57**

The accused was a female convicted of trafficking 1.6kg of methamphetamine under s.39B DDA.

She appealed to the Court of Appeal in 2019 on several grounds. First, the credibility of the drug exhibits given the appellant’s defence that she had made a small cut in the packets containing the drugs to examine the contents. The chemist stated that upon receiving the packets, there was no such ‘cut’. On appeal, the Court found that this was sufficient to conclude that the accused did not make a cut in the packets. Second, that there was a break in the chain of evidence regarding the exhibits identifying the substance trafficked as drugs. The Court concluded that the exhibits were handed over by the authorities to the investigating officer and the chemist for analysis.
The Appeal Court was satisfied that the date and signatures on the exhibits were correct. Third, the search list tendered was altered and was different to the original search list. The Court simply concluded that this was not true relying on testimony of the police that the lists were identical. Fourth, there were discrepancies in the weight of the drugs measured by the chemist and the customs officer, and this gave rise to a reasonable doubt as to the identity of those drugs. The Court concluded that it would be better for the prosecution to be given the opportunity to offer a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy. After hearing the prosecution’s submissions, the Court found that there was no reasonable doubt on the facts.

The appellant also submitted that the trial judge erred in failing to properly consider the case put forward by the defence. The defence argued that the appellant conducted a business in China and that she came to Malaysia on the suggestion of her female friend, Zhang Xijuan, who lived here. The appellant submitted that she met with her friend’s boyfriend in China who asked her to carry two packets of Chinese tea and a tea pot to Zhang Xijuan and he advised the appellant to place this in her luggage. She did not suspect anything and did not check the luggage. The appellant, on arriving in Malaysia, was informed that Zhang Xijuan had returned to Hong Kong and her boyfriend instructed the appellant to deliver the tea to Hong Kong. The appellant showed the Malaysian authorities all the communications between herself and Zhang Xijuan, including her contact number and photos. The trial judge rejected this defence. This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeal which concluded that the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption of possession and knowledge under s.37(d) DDA on the balance of probabilities.

Samim Sainsha (India) v PP [2019] MLJU 243

The appellant, an Indian national, was convicted of trafficking 746g methamphetamine pursuant to s.39B DDA. The Court rejected the defence of innocent carrier finding that the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s.37(d) DDA. The appellant had argued that she was recruited by an employment agent named Abdullah who had promised her a job in Malaysia. She did not deny taking the bag containing the drugs from the luggage carousel at Kuala Lumpur International Airport, but did submit that she had done so mistakenly. She also submitted that whilst the bag was being examined by the Customs Officer, a contact of Abdullah’s had called her. The trial judge said that this defence was a mere afterthought and fabrication since the appellant never lodged a report of mistaken luggage with the police or Airport Authority.

On appeal, the appellant said that the trial judge erred in finding that the chemist was an expert since the ‘expertise’ had not been proven. The chemist had failed to adhere to s.45 Evidence Act which required that she give details of her background. However, the Court found this was not fatal to the prosecution case since the required identification of the substance was an opinion of chemists which was merely elementary in nature. The appellant also submitted that she had raised a reasonable doubt as to her knowledge of the drugs. However, the Court simply found that there was no coincidence that the bag collected was similar to the bag the appellant owned and highlighted that the contents of the bag contained traditional female Indian clothes which all fitted the appellant. Ultimately, it was found that even if Abdullah was not fictitious, this makes little difference to the defence of innocent carrier since the appellant had taken the bag containing the drugs.

Nabweteme Hadija v PP [2015] 1 LNS 1259

The appellant, a female national of Uganda, was convicted of trafficking 2kg of methamphetamine under s.39B DDA. The accused claimed that she had sent her old luggage bag to be dry cleaned. When she collected the bag, it was still wet. As she needed to board her flight to Malaysia, she borrowed another bag from her friend and neighbour, Vicky. Vicky gave the bag to the appellant’s son, Christopher. Vicky informed the appellant that the bag belonged to her husband and the appellant submitted that she had no knowledge that drugs were hidden in the bag. On arrival in Penang on 7 September 2010, the appellant was informed by Thai police that her bag was in Bangkok for an ‘unknown reason’.
On 9 September 2010, the appellant collected her bag from the Baggage Service Section in Penang after signing a release form and obtaining customs clearance after which two officers from the Narcotics Division examined the appellant’s bag. The defence witness, Hajah Noraihan who was a member of the Ugandan consulate in Malaysia, gave evidence that she had met with the appellant whilst detained and had interviewed the appellant’s son, Christopher, discovering that Vicky had left Uganda and closed her shop. However, the trial judge found that the defence had failed to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision and said further that there was no evidence of motive indicating Vicky would plant the drugs in the appellant’s bag and further that the appellant’s ‘suspicious’ conduct after collecting the bag indicates knowledge. This conduct is relevant under s.8 Evidence Act.

**PP v Lan Yi Ling [2017] 7 MLJ 214**

The accused was convicted of trafficking 336g of methamphetamine under s.39B DDA. The accused raised the defence of innocent carrier on the basis that a man of African ethnicity, named Clintin whom she had befriended through an online dating website, had sought her assistance in taking a box containing women’s clothing and accessories to his brother living in Kuala Lumpur. The accused had known Clintin for only 3 months and had only met him online. She was offered payment of RM 5,000 to help Clintin and his brother. The accused denied knowledge of the presence of the drugs in the box and said that she had no reason to be suspicious since the box was to be given to Clintin’s brother. The Court, however, rejected the defence stating instead that the accused was liable under the principle of wilful blindness, particularly since the accused did not have sufficient details for Clintin or his brother to corroborate her evidence. The Court said further that even though the character Clintin was not fictitious and did in fact exist, the accused was a volunteer drug mule who had knowingly agreed to deliver the drugs for a sum of money, free flights and accommodation.

**4.7 Additional Defences**

In the context of this report, two further defences that may be relevant are the defence of mental impairment and the defence of duress. In practice, these defences are not formally raised in death penalty cases, but, can be used by defence lawyers as a form of mitigating circumstances in sentencing. The benefit in doing so is that it exculpates liability rather than form part of the surrounding context.

**a) Defence of Mental Impairment or ‘Insanity’**

In Malaysia, the defence of mental impairment, referred to as the insanity defence, is articulated in s 84 of the **Penal Code** which states that ‘[n]othing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law’.

In order to make out the defence successfully, the following elements must be satisfied:

- that the accused was of unsound mind/insane (a term not defined by the Code nor by the courts);
- that the insanity mentally impaired the accused;
- that that the accused was not capable knowing the nature of their act; and
- that what they did was wrong, and/or what they did was contrary to the law.

The burden of proof is on the accused to demonstrate that he or she was ‘insane’ on a balance of probabilities. If successful, an accused will obtain a qualified acquittal.
Malaysian jurisprudence on the defence indicates that courts may find that an accused is of unsound mind without any clinical evidence in support of that fact.250 For example, according to the Malaysian Federal Court in Rajagopal v PP:

In this connection we were guided by the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in England in the case of James Frank Rivett [1951] 34 Cr App R 87. It was held in that case that the issue is one to be determined by a jury and not by medical men of whatever eminence; and where a jury has found a prisoner guilty despite strong evidence by medical men of the highest standing that he was insane at the material time, the Court of Criminal Appeal will not interfere with the verdict, unless it is satisfied that no reasonable jury could have found a verdict of guilty in the particular case.251

It therefore appears that the success of the defence is dependent on whether the trial judge accepts the factual finding of insanity. Medical evidence may be only one factor upon which the trial judge makes his or her finding.

Some suggest that the operation of the defence has room for improvement.252 In particular, Azzat suggests that there ought to be greater emphasis placed on the evidence from medical experts when determining when an accused is ‘insane’. This may include a process where medical evidence is adduced from more than one expert, or to have a number of court-appointed medical experts whose role is to provide information to trial judges rather than advocate for one party’s position. A more progressive approach is ‘the creation of a clinical expert tribunal to decide between competing expert opinions, with a third option being to educate trial judges to become as close to being a clinical expert as possible’.253

(b) Defence of Duress

The defence of duress is available in Malaysia pursuant to s 94 of the Penal Code. The purpose of this defence is to provide a justification for an accused’s conduct that would otherwise be criminal. In order to make out this defence, an accused must satisfy the court that he or she was compelled to commit an offence because of ‘threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably caused the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise by the consequence’.254 This is of course dependent on the fact that the accused did not commit the offensive act of his or her own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to themselves short of instant death, placed upon themselves in the situation which they became subject to such a constraint.

It should be noted that according to the decision of Mohamed Yusof Bin Haji Ahmad v PP,255 the duress must be ‘imminent, extreme and persistent’.256 In this decision, the accused was charged with trafficking in cannabis in contravention of s 39(B)(1)(a) of the DDA and claimed the defence of duress. The accused’s submission was that ‘he had carried the drug under threat from a Thai man… [who] had threatened him with a pistol and told him to carry the cannabis across the border into Malaysia. If he did so he would be paid M$400. If he did not he would be shot’.257 At first instance, the President of the Sessions Court held that the accused was not able to claim the defence successfully as “the alleged threat was improbable”.258 On appeal, the High Court held that ‘even if the accused’s story was true, the defence would fail’.259 On appeal, the conviction was affirmed as was the sentence of life imprisonment. The additional punishment of whipping was quashed because of ‘extenuating circumstances, which led him to commit the offence’.260
Perhaps of most concern is that the defence of duress, under the Penal Code is limited in its application. It is not, for example, available for an offence against the State punishable with death, which would include offending under the DDA.\footnote{Peter English, ‘The Defence of Duress’ [p 230] 408.} The second issue that requires addressing is that the defence of duress appears to be only applicable where a threat of death has been made directly to the accused. It does not apply to circumstances where the accused is threatened with violence, or if alternatively someone other than the accused is threatened within the vicinity of the accused.
Key Findings and Recommendations

Since 2018, Malaysia has witnessed substantial progress in working towards the abolition of the death penalty. Of most significance in this context, was the introduction of an official moratorium on all executions in 2018, and the introduction of a discretionary death penalty for drug-trafficking offences in a number of limited circumstances, also in 2018.

Notwithstanding, this report has demonstrated how the current Malaysian death penalty framework falls short of current fair trial guarantees and standards that are enshrined either domestically or internationally. Lawyers appearing in criminal trials with experience in death penalty cases who were interviewed for this report, illuminated the ways in which these standards and guarantees are undermined. Common themes that emerged in these interviews were:

- the unique challenges faced by foreign national defendants who may not have adequate access to interpreters at all stages of a criminal matter;
- that legal aid funding is limited which has an impact on the way in which counsel can defend the matter effectively at all stages of the trial;
- that discovery by the prosecution is insufficient;
- that legal representation is not provided for during the petitions and clemency process because the framework does not necessarily allow for it;
- that the petitions and clemency process can be arbitrary; and
- that reasons for decisions, or dissenting judgments are not published in certain cases.

This was supported by our analysis of cases, which demonstrated the challenges that the drug trafficking provisions pursuant to the DDA present. In particular, our analysis illustrated the four concerns arising in connection with the operation of the double presumptions: unclear wording of the legislation; that the provisions inadvertently provide enforcement agencies with judicial power; that the double presumptions shift the evidential burden on to the accused and that the reforms are not retrospective.

Where the state is empowered to impose the death penalty – the ultimate irrevocable sentence – the judicial system must uphold access to justice and fair trial procedures to the highest standards available.

For this reason, the following recommendations arise from the findings of this report:

**RATIFICATION OF TREATIES AND ALIGNMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS**

- That the Malaysian Government consider the international jurisprudence emerging from the right to life and the right to fair trial and join the global trend to abolish the death penalty for all offences.
- In the interim, the official moratorium on all executions should continue.
- In the interim, in accordance with the March 2019 UN Chief Executive Board for Coordination recommendations, the Malaysian Government should abolish the death penalty in relation to all forms of drug offending involving the possession, trafficking or importation of drugs.
REVIEW THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT 1952

- That section 37A under the DDA be abolished removing the availability of the double presumptions.
- That section 39B(2) & (2A) be abolished and section 41B(1)(a) be amended accordingly.
- In the interim, section 39B(2A) ought to be amended to provide sentencing judges unfettered discretion to sentence an accused convicted of drug trafficking.
- Those who have been sentenced under mandatory sentencing practices should be afforded judicial review whereby mitigating factors including ‘character, antecedents, age, health or mental condition of the offender or to the trivial nature of the offence or to any extenuating circumstances’ are considered by a sentencing judge, and sentencing principles, such as general and specific deterrence are applied.

STRENGTHENING FAIR TRIAL PROCEDURES

- A systematic monitoring and reporting mechanism monitoring capital offence trials ought to be designed and implemented. This focus of this mechanism would be to facilitate the collection and publication of comprehensive figures on the death penalty.
- The right to communicate with a lawyer ought to be made available at the first instance that an accused is arrested.
- Legal aid funding ought be provided to death penalty matters as a priority to ensure that if they wish to, accused can retain the same lawyer for all aspects of the trial. Additionally, adequate funding should be provided to ensure that the defence lawyer has sufficient time and access to evidence.
- For foreign nationals, questioning ought to be conducted with an appropriately qualified interpreter at the first point with which they come into contact with the criminal justice system process, typically at arrest. The accused should also be provided with an opportunity to communicate with their consular office, at the same time that they are provided an opportunity to communicate with a lawyer.
- The prosecution ought to provide all of the evidence to the defence counsel and/or the accused during the pre-trial discovery process, including any evidence that is supportive of a defence. It must be provided at least fourteen days before the evidence is to be adduced in Court.
- That in terms of the process of adducing expert evidence a clinical expert tribunal be established to make a determination on expert opinion. Alternatively, a process is introduced whereby trial judges undertake training to position themselves into the role of a clinical expert as much as possible.
- Reasons for all Court decisions in capital offence cases ought to be made available to the public. Dissenting judgments should also be written and published accordingly.
• Those sentenced under mandatory sentencing practices should be afforded judicial review whereby individual circumstances including ‘character, antecedents, age, health or mental condition of the offender or to the trivial nature of the offence or to any extenuating circumstances’\textsuperscript{262} are considered by a sentencing judge and a sentence including general and specific deterrence considerations is applied.

• That the delay between trial and appeal not be unreasonable so as to avoid undue strain on the mental health of the prisoner.

• That legal representation for the appeals and clemency stages be fully funded to allow the prisoner ultimate protection of their rights.

• That a transparent process be established that governs the clemency process. This would include permitting the prisoner and their lawyer to attend the hearing and be provided with reasons for the Boards’ decision.

• That while a prisoner is petitioning for pardon, their death sentence is automatically suspended pending completion of the process.

• That the Malaysian Parliament make available the defences of duress and mental impairment expressly to those accused of the death penalty.

Evident throughout this report is that a significant population of those sentenced to death in Malaysia is comprised of individuals convicted of drug offending, many of whom face socio-economic, nationality and language barriers that prohibit their access to the requisite level of legal assistance needed to properly test the prosecution case. This is compounded by legal frameworks that fall short of ensuring fair trial guarantees that are paramount. It is hoped that the research and the recommendations identified in this report provide a significant contribution to discussions and reforms aimed at ultimately abolishing the death penalty in Malaysia.
Appendicies and References

Appendix I: Methodology and Approach

Appendix II: Illustrative Cases Involving Capital Charges for Drug Trafficking Under s 39B DDA for the period 1978 to 2019

References
Methodology and Approach

This report adopts a mixed-methods approach to provide a detailed analysis of whether the Malaysian criminal justice system delivers fair trial for those facing the death penalty.

There are three components to this methodology. The first is a detailed analysis of the existing literature on issues relating to Malaysian death penalty trials for drug-related offences and fair trial guarantees. Particular emphasis is placed on the mitigating circumstances of offenders and what consideration if any, was accorded to their individual background.

The second component is the consideration of that framework in the context of relevant death penalty cases. Case study research is particularly beneficial in examining questions of “how” and “why”, while taking into consideration how a phenomenon is influenced by the context within which it is situated. For this report, undertaking case study research provided a mechanism to gain significant insight into specific cases, and it allowed for data to be gathered from a variety of sources, triangulated and converged to illuminate the issues. The purpose of this is to demonstrate fair trial guarantee issues that arise in death penalty matters concerning prisoners sentenced for drug-related offences.

The decisions detailed in Table 5: Illustrative Cases Involving Capital Charges for Drug Trafficking Under s 39B DDA for the period 1978 to 2019, were selected because they illustrate common features of a prisoner’s experience of fair trial process and death penalty proceedings in Malaysia. The case studies were extracted from an analysis of approximately 200 court judgments found online spanning the years of 1978 to 2019. Decisions selected as case studies are not outlier cases, but rather representative cases. The purpose of this is to be able to extrapolate relevant themes and issues that may affect a typical accused.

The final component consists of structured qualitative interviews with Malaysian lawyers with experience in criminal cases, particularly death penalty cases. These interviews build upon the issues identified in the case studies, incorporating into the report the insights of those closely involved in death penalty proceedings. The approach adopted in this report for conducting the qualitative interviews was standardised open-ended interviews. This form of interviewing allows for structured open-ended questions whereby participants were asked identical questions modified only by their professional context. This ensures consistency in the structure of the interview, which in turn facilitates an accurate comparison between stakeholder responses. At the same time, the open-ended interview allows for maximum flexibility in answering the questions, allowing stakeholders to contribute as much detailed information as they wish to.

Invitations to participate in the interview were sent out via an email letter to the key stakeholders. Thirty-nine invitations were sent out in total. An attempt was made to ensure that a varied representation was obtained when seeking participants. Thirteen interviewees accepted the invitation, and 26 declined. The interviewees were lawyers who had experience in criminal law defending accused in death penalty proceedings.

The interviews were conducted in accordance with an approval granted by the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee. When inviting stakeholders to conduct the interview, an Explanatory Statement and Consent Form was provided in accordance with the Monash University Human Research Ethics guidelines. Once consent was obtained, the interviews were conducted at a time and place of convenience for the interviewees. The interviews were no longer than an hour and were recorded on a digital recorder and subsequently transcribed.

The approach adopted to integrating the interviews was to identify those narrative responses which most clearly addressed the relevant questions, either positively or negatively. These responses were then included at relevant points in the report to elaborate on specific issues that required direct input from stakeholders, and to further develop the analysis.
Table 5: Illustrative Cases Involving Capital Charges for Drug Trafficking Under s 39B DDA for the period 1978 to 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Name</th>
<th>Court</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Type of Drug Trafficked (Qty)</th>
<th>Age, Nationality or Ethnicity</th>
<th>Issues of concern at trial</th>
<th>Innocent Carrier defence raised?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Phrueksa Taemchim v Public Prosecutor [2013] 6 MLJ 808</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Cocaine (713.79g)</td>
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<td>Alma Nudo-Alienza v PP &amp; Another [2019] 5 CLJ 780 (Alienza)</td>
<td>Federal Court</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Methamphetamine (2556.4g) Cocaine (693.4g)</td>
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<td>PP v Huang Ziling [2020] 1 MLJ 378</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Methamphetamine (1.4kg)</td>
<td>Foreign national (China)</td>
<td>• Double Presumptions*</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
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<td>PP v Duangchit Khonthokhonburi [2016] MLJU 1097</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>Kabunda Sakaji Eddy v PP [2018] MLJU 1887</td>
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<td>Methamphetamine (280.7g)</td>
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<td>Methan Aydroos Mohamed Pillai Naina Mohamed v PP [2013] 1 LNS 968</td>
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<td>Foreign national (India)</td>
<td>• Burden of Proof</td>
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<td>High Court</td>
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<td>Cannabis (88997.7g)</td>
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<td>PP v Winfred Mukiri Nkiiri [2019] MLJU 828</td>
<td>High Court</td>
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<td>Caniete Robelyn Mastelero v PP [2019] 1 LNS 397</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Methamphetamine (2268.2g)</td>
<td>Foreign national (Macau)</td>
<td>• Failure to Provide Information Required for Prosecution to Conduct Sufficient Inquiries Regarding the Identity of Witnesses* • Wilful Blindness*</td>
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<td>Ikenna Emmanual Chukwudulu v PP [2019] MLJU 165</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>Hu Yanyu v PP [2019] 4 MLJ 349</td>
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<td>Methamphetamine (1674.7g)</td>
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<td>Case Name</td>
<td>Court</td>
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<td>Issues of concern</td>
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<td>PP v Lan Yi Ling [2017] MLJU 115</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>PP v Iflag Mary Melanie Callipan</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Methamphetamine (2285g)</td>
<td>Foreign national (Hong Kong)</td>
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<td>PP v Judith Achieng Odyo</td>
<td>High Court</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Methamphetamine (3kg)</td>
<td>Foreign national (Kenya)</td>
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<td>Sammir Sainisha (India) v PP</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Methamphetamine (25kg)</td>
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<td>• Presumption of Trafficking* • Burden of Proof* • Expert Evidence*</td>
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<td>Nathweterne Hadija v PP [2015]</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Methamphetamine (2kg)</td>
<td>Foreign national (Uganda)</td>
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<td>Anala Johnson v PP [2019] MLJU 128</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Ketamine (4028.4g)</td>
<td>Foreign national (India) aged 48 years old (widowed)</td>
<td>• Wilful Blindness* • Presumption of Trafficking*</td>
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<td>Liang Youmei v PP [2019] 1 LNS 54</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
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<td>Methamphetamine (1529.7g)</td>
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<td>• Standard of Investigation* • Accused Evidence</td>
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<td>Letitia Bosman v PP [2017] MLJU 263</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
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<td>Foreign national (South Africa)</td>
<td>• Double Presumptions* • Adverse Inference from Conduct Under the Evidence Act 1950 (Malaysia)*</td>
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<td>PP v Limneswaran Jegathesan [2019] 1 LNS 494</td>
<td>Court of Appeal</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Methamphetamine (736.6g)</td>
<td>Malaysian citizen of Indian ethnicity (did not speak Bahasa Malaysia)</td>
<td>• Double Presumptions* • Presumption of Innocence • Bare Denial</td>
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<td>PP v Lakshmanan Malairolandu [2019] 1 LNS 94</td>
<td>Court of Appeal</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Heroin (8.4g)</td>
<td>Malaysian citizen of Indian ethnicity</td>
<td>• Confession • Bare Denial • Presumption of Knowledge* • Adverse Inference Under s 8 of the Evidence Act 1950 (Malaysia)*</td>
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<td>PP v Denish a/l Madhavan [2009] MLJU 194</td>
<td>Federal Court (allowed, resulting in death sentence)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Cannabis (11.2685g)</td>
<td>Malaysian citizen of Indian ethnicity</td>
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<td>Thenagaran Ganapathy v PP &amp; Other Appeal [2019] 1 LNS 1100</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Cannabis (12418g)</td>
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<td>• Credibility of Witness* • Acting in Concert*</td>
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<td>PP v Vinod Raj Uthayakumar [2019] MLJU</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed, but death sentence retained)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Cannabis (237g)</td>
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<td>• Bare Denial* • Double Presumptions*</td>
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<td>Gopi Kumar Subramaniarm v PP [2019] MLJU 531</td>
<td>Court of Appeal (dismissed)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Cannabis (45290g) Heroin (18.4g) Methamphetamine (16.20g)</td>
<td>Malaysian citizen of Indian ethnicity</td>
<td>• Double Presumptions* • Burden of Proof*</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>
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